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Abstract
Decision makers’ initial and continued use of information technology has traditionally been viewed as a
mindful and intentional behavior. However, when a decision aid makes mostly correct
recommendations, its users may become complacent. That is, users may accept recommendations
without mindfully considering the recommendations or involvement with the aid. As such, they may be
more likely to accept inaccurate recommendations. We draw on dual-processing theory to describe why
users might behave in a mindless and complacent rather than mindful manner when using a decision
aid. In our experimental investigation, we manipulated the accuracy of the recommendations provided
by a decision aid and observe users’ performance on a complex decision task. Using the decision aid,
participants completed five task trials. To assess complacency and intentionality, we compared
subjective (i.e., self-report) and objective (i.e., gaze data via an eye tracker) use measures. Our
analysis and comparison of the subjective and objective responses indicate that, contrary to widespread
theorizing, decision aid usage and continuance appear to be less intentional than commonly believed.
Further, we found that a decision aid’s users can be vulnerable to complacency even when
recommendations are known to be inaccurate. Based on the findings of our study, we offer theoretical
and practical implications regarding complacency and intentionality in technology use.
Keywords: IT Use, Complacency, Eye Tracking, Intentionality, Dual-Processing Theory.
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1. Introduction
Organizations derive significant benefit from deploying computerized decision aids to support employee
decision making (e.g., McNab, Hess, & Valacich, 2011). However, along with these benefits can come
drawbacks that undermine the sizeable investments firms make in such decision support systems. In
many settings, decision aids are not always accurate, and users’ unquestioning reliance on their
recommendations can have major negative consequences, especially in critical contexts such as military
applications, financial markets, or air traffic control (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Consider these three
headlines:
•

Young people wrongly jailed because of computer error, court finds (AAP, 2013)

•

Gate glitch traps a tanker in Piscataqua River (McDermott, 2013)

•

Npower error cost my family a mortgage (Blackmore, 2014)

In each case, reliance on a decision aid’s recommendation resulted in humans taking incorrect action:
numerous young people in Australia were wrongly imprisoned for violating bail because of incorrect
information on the law enforcement computer system (AAP, 2013); an oil tanker was temporarily trapped
in the Piscataqua River when the computer systems incorrectly reported that the bridge gates were open
(McDermott, 2013); and a couple’s mortgage application was rejected after their utility company’s
software incorrectly put a non-payment mark on their credit history (Blackmore, 2014). These cases and
countless other anecdotes illustrate that, when individuals are not aware or mindful of their reliance on
technology, such complacency can result in undesired outcomes. In this paper, we examine complacency
by conducting an empirical study to observe individuals’ objective and subjective reliance on a decision
aid while they make complex decisions.
Complacency entails sub-standard monitoring of a decision aid (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010) and
occurs when individuals fail to observe or adequately assess the proper operation of a decision aid. It is
most frequently observed in the form of individuals accepting recommendations from decision aids
without questioning them (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). If a decision aid obtains 100 percent accuracy,
complacency is not an issue because reliance on such a system would yield perfect decisions every time.
However, most decision aids perform imperfectly (Goddard, Roudsari, & Wyatt, 2012), and, therefore,
require a human decision maker to oversee their operation. Therefore, complacency is a critical issue
because it is the responsibility of human decision makers to synthesize the information supplied by the
decision aid to make the ultimate decision.
Researchers have studied some post-adoption IS/IT use-related constructs that, on the surface, appear
similar to complacency (e.g., IS habit, IS continuance, satisficing). A common theme across all of these
constructs, including complacency, is that they concern post-adoption phenomena (Jasperson, Carter, &
Zmud, 2005) that drive the continued and potentially automatic use of IS. However, complacency differs
from the other constructs in terms of unintentionality and the potential negative consequences it can
have. IS habit refers to “the extent to which people tend to perform behaviors (use IS) automatically
because of learning” (Limayem, Hirt, & Cheung, 2007, p. 709). Habit encompasses subconscious
behaviors that are inculcated automatically and differs from “experience” in the sense that it entails
behavioral tendencies that are formed based on learned responses to a stable context (Limayem & Hirt,
2003) and requires weekly repetition of use at the minimum (Limayem et al., 2007). IS continuance refers
to users’ intention to continue using a certain IS (Bhattacherjee, 2001). Continuance is anteceded by
users’ satisfaction with the IS and its perceived usefulness. “Satisficing” (Simon, 1956), a concept that is
similar to complacency, has also been studied in computer-aided decision making contexts, which refers
to making acceptable but non-optimal decisions based on the available information (Newell & Simon,
1972), including raw data and/or decision aid recommendations. Decision aid users often tend to sacrifice
decision accuracy for effort reduction (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), which is easily achieved by
(over)relying on the aid’s recommendations.
There are three core features that define complacency (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010) and also
AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction

Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp.17-42, March 2015

18

Complacency and Intentionality in IT Use and Continuance

Yetgin et. al

distinguish it from habit, continuance, and satisficing: first, it involves human monitoring of an automated
system. Second, such monitoring occurs less often than what is standard or optimal and, thus, is
considered “substandard”. Third, there is a direct and observable effect on system performance (i.e., the
setting in which the recommendations of a decision aid are enacted) as a result of substandard
monitoring. While complacency only applies in automation or recommendation-based decision making
contexts, habit and continuance apply to the use of IS in general and may not necessarily involve the
monitoring of the IS. Both habit and continuance are a result of conscious satisfaction in using or
interacting with the IS, regardless of the need of human monitoring. For instance, they have been
observed in the contexts of Internet use (Limayem et al., 2007), online banking (Bhattacherjee, 2001),
and the use of Internet-based communication tools (Limayem & Hirt, 2003). All of these contexts involve
interaction with an IS and the formation of (repeated) usage behaviors without the need for human
operators to monitor any information or make any decisions for the IS to function. Complacency, on the
other hand, only applies to decision making contexts where there is a consistent need for monitoring, and
it develops because the inaccuracies of the IS are unintentionally dismissed due to substandard
monitoring. Satisficing similarly applies in recommendation-based decision making contexts but differs
from complacency in that it is not a result of unintentional substandard monitoring and that satisficing
users may intentionally sacrifice accuracy in an attempt to spend less effort while achieving an acceptable
performance level (Payne et al., 1993). Furthermore, complacency implies direct, undesired, and
unforeseen negative effects on system performance, whereas habit, continuance, and satisficing form
based on users’ positive experiences or expectations regarding performance improvements
(Bhattacherjee, 2001; Limayem & Hirt, 2003) or effort reduction (Paquette & Kida, 1988). Accordingly,
complacency research almost exclusively focuses on the negative consequences of IS use regarding
economic, safety, or performance outcomes (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010), while such consequences
of IS use have not been studied extensively in the contexts of habit, continuance, or satisficing.
Despite the potential for complacency, the MIS literature has traditionally conceptualized individuals’
technology use intentions as mindful actions; that is, the result of rational decision making (e.g., the
technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) or the unified theory of acceptance and use of
technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003)). The theory of reasoned action (TRA)
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) underlie both TAM and
UTAUT. Both theories conceptualize human behavior as intentional and mindful; as such, technology use
has also been viewed as intentional and mindful. However, other related literatures, including psychology,
suggest that technology use might be more automatic and less intentional than the MIS literature has
typically argued (Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009). Therefore, investigating technology use through
intentions or similar self-reported metrics, which presumes that individuals are aware (i.e., mindful) of their
actions, may have resulted in an incomplete understanding of IT usage. Note that some past MIS
research has shown that individuals’ actual IT usage can be quite different from their perceived (i.e., selfreported) usage (Straub, Limayem, & Karahanna-Evaristo, 1995).
We investigate the development of complacency in the context of a complex decision making task (i.e.,
stock purchasing). To better understand complacency, we conducted an exploratory empirical study for
which we “develop[ed] [new] instrumentation … to measure the cognitions and use behaviors associated
with … post-adoptive behavior” as previous research has suggested (Jasperson et al., 2005, p. 548).
Specifically, we observed the extent to which decision makers engaged in verification efforts by collecting
objective measures via an eye tracker under different levels of decision-aid accuracy. We also examined
how complacency was reflected in decision makers’ self-reported trust and reliance on the decision aid.
To avoid limiting our ability to detect findings in this initial investigation, we report as significant all findings
at or below alpha = 0.10.
Our findings contribute to the understanding of technology use in three broad avenues. First, our results
suggest that the assumptions of rational or mindful use might not always hold. Second, they help explain
how and when complacency and intentionality occur, which constitutes the first step in mitigating the
misuse, disuse, and abuse of decision aids (see Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Third, they uncover the
effects of a decision aid’s accuracy on its users’ reliance on the aid, which helps recognize the
consequences and implications of inaccuracy in decision aids, especially with regards to intentionality and
complacency. Our theoretical contribution to the IS/IT use literature lies in elucidating the automatic and
mindless nature of users’ continued reliance on decision aids because we provide empirical support for
the arguments of Ortiz de Guinea and Markus (2009) regarding unintentionality in technology use.
AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction
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2. Theoretical Development
To frame our investigation of complacency, we build on dual processing theory (Kahneman, 2011), which
argues that individuals have two distinct approaches (i.e., system 1 and system 2) to cognitive
processing. System 1 is always active and continuously processes large amounts of information without
our conscious awareness or intention. Perhaps developed as an evolutionary safety mechanism, system
1 allows humans to make quick and effortless decisions based on environmental stimuli, such as the
decision to avoid or approach a potential incoming threat. When relying on system 2, humans carefully
weigh information before reaching a conclusion to make relatively more thoughtful and accurate
decisions. System 2 requires considerable attention and cognitive effort, which humans have a strong
tendency to conserve (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993); hence, it must be intentionally activated. Thus,
individuals make many daily and regular decisions via system 1 while reserving system 2 only for novel,
important, or complex decisions (Kahneman, 2011).
This tradeoff between system 1 and system 2 (low vs. high effort) echoes other cognitive information
processing theories, such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b)
and the heuristic-systematic model of information processing (HSM) (Chaiken, 1980, 1987). A common
theme in all of these theories is that an individual can either carefully and thoroughly consider information
before making a decision or make a decision using superficial heuristics, which essentially serve as
mental shortcuts (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b; Tam & Ho, 2005). The notion
that humans may sacrifice accuracy to conserve cognitive effort is emblematic of how individuals process
information in their daily lives and make decisions, be they simple or complex. Table 1 presents a brief
overall comparison of system 1 versus system 2 (see also, Kahneman, 2011).
Table 1. Brief Summary of the Dual Processing Theory
System 1

System 2

Decision mechanism

Snap judgment / Intuition

Careful consideration

Activation mechanism

Automatic / Always On

Intentional

Effort level

Easy and effortless

Tiring and effortful

Decision
characteristics

Fast and efficient

Careful and good judgment

Decision outcome

Mostly biased

Mostly critical

Consistent with the above argument, research investigating computer-aided decision making has also
found evidence of system 1 and system 2 decision making. Providing supplementary cues (i.e.,
heuristics) to emergency response dispatchers improved dispatchers’ information selections and
processing performance while decreasing their response time (McNab et al., 2011). Further, these cues
were observed to be more beneficial under increased time pressure and task complexity. Note, however,
that the cues provided by the decision aid were always accurate. The findings of this research and other
similar research in different contexts such as credibility assessment or online shopping (e.g., Jensen,
Lowry, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2010; Reisen & Hoffrage, 2010) point to the importance and
effectiveness of supporting heuristic processing in complex decision making tasks. However, in many
circumstances, it is impossible to develop a decision aid that always provides perfectly accurate
recommendations. Hence, other research highlights the dangers of promoting system 1 processing
because imperfect heuristics or inaccurate cues can result in biased or inaccurate decisions (e.g., Allen &
Parsons, 2010; Meservy, Jensen, & Fadel, 2013).

3. Complacency and Intentionality
When individuals encounter a novel situation, such as using a new decision aid of unknown function and
reliability, they are likely to first approach it cautiously to determine if it merits consideration during the
decision making process. Due to its novelty, individuals are likely to examine and test the performance of
the unfamiliar decision aid carefully (i.e., via system 2) until they become familiar with the aid.
Over time, as individuals develop experience with the decision aid, they are likely to obtain a sense of its
accuracy with which they develop an opinion about the function and reliability of the aid’s
AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction
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recommendations. Given that individuals tend to conserve cognitive effort (Payne et al., 1993), the
effortful, careful, and intentional consideration of the decision aid’s performance (via system 2) is likely to
diminish over time. Instead, users are likely to rely on simple heuristics to govern their use of a decision
aid. Put differently, over time, system 1 will begin to dominate individuals’ interactions with the decision
aid to replace the careful consideration supported by system 2 reasoning. Such a shift can occur
seamlessly and rapidly because system 1 always runs in the background and can suggest actions based
on impressions and intuitions of the aid. In turn, users can easily adopt such suggestions and, thus, return
to the default low-effort mode of decision making (Kahneman, 2011). Thus, individuals’ use and
continuance behaviors are expected to evolve such that they naturally shift to a reliance on simple
heuristics and mental short cuts, seeding individuals for the development of complacency.
Complacency arises, then, as individuals abdicate their responsibility for decision making and blindly accept
the recommendation of the decision aid without verifying the aid’s recommendation. If the decision aids
were infallible, complacency would not be a danger, but few decision aids can guarantee complete
accuracy. In addition, complacency is more likely when a decision aid is highly, but imperfectly, reliable
(Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). In such cases, the probability of users detecting an inaccurate
recommendation decreases steadily and significantly over time (Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996). Hence, we
anticipate recommendation verification efforts to decrease over time regardless of decision aid accuracy.
Further, other work suggests that users’ monitoring performance declines as recommendation reliability
becomes constant (Parasuraman et al., 1993). Thus, we expect the users of a highly reliable decision aid to
accept its recommendations increasingly easily and, thus, spend less time and attention on the raw
information related to the task or assessing the correctness of the decision aid’s recommendations.
H1: A user spends less effort verifying a decision aid’s recommendations as their number of usage
trials increases.
H2: Higher decision aid accuracy is associated with a decrease in users’ recommendation
verification efforts as their number of usage trials increases.
As individuals become accustomed to a decision aid and rely on its recommendations, we can expect their
usage pattern with the decision aid to change. Past work has shown that abnormal or unexpected decision
aid actions (e.g., erroneous recommendations) have a negative impact on the trust users place in the
decision aid and their future usage intentions (Komiak & Benbasat, 2006). However, we argue that this
decrease in trust and anticipated usage may diverge from actual usage behaviors. The heuristics that drive
our actions under system 1 are often formed and applied outside of conscious thought (Kahneman, 2011).
Thus, while individuals may be aware that recommendations from a decision aid are only partly trustworthy,
they can accept and implement the recommendations regardless. Inaccurate decision aid recommendations
may not be sufficient to prevent users from employing a quick heuristic approach by relying on the advice
offered by the decision aid. Evidence for this concept has been observed where individuals’ self-reports of
their use intentions and actual usage behaviors significantly differ, indicated by the lack of correspondence
between self-reported and computer-recorded technology (i.e., voice-mail) use (Straub et al., 1995). In fact,
usage intentions only accounted for a third of the variance in actual use even when, for example, the most
desirable and accurate self-report measures were used (Kim & Malhotra, 2005). Similarly, a nomological net
analysis that Straub et al. (1995) performed suggests that IT use can be factored into two independent
subconstructs (i.e., actual usage and self-reported usage), possibly with different antecedents and/or
consequences. Based on these results, they called for future research to examine the lack of
correspondence between these subconstructs and suggested modifying the theoretical basis of TAM by
reformulating the dependent variable as the perceived system use rather than actual use.
As we note earlier, recent arguments suggest that using decision aids may be much less intentional and
more automatic than previously assumed (Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009), which, together with dualprocessing theory, can help explain the divergence between self-reported (i.e., perceived) and actual
usage of technology. If system 1 becomes more influential on decision aid use over time as we argue, it is
likely that users will continue to employ the recommendations of a decision aid even when their perceived
usage and usage intentions decrease due to the perceived inaccuracy of the aid. This occurs because
their actual usage is driven mostly by their automatic and subconscious tendency to conserve cognitive
effort and attention, whereas their perceived usage might decline in conjunction with their trust in the
system. Lee and Moray (1992) observed this phenomenon in an empirical study. They conclude that
AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction

Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp.17-42, March 2015

21

Complacency and Intentionality in IT Use and Continuance

Yetgin et. al

“operators’ use of automatic controllers depends upon more than trust alone” (p. 1268) after finding that
chronic faults by a decision aid led to increased use together with decreased trust. Previous research also
suggests that perceived reliability, trust, usage intentions, and self-reported technology use are closely
related (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Komiak & Benbasat, 2006; Pavlou, 2003). Further, actual and selfreported technology use can vary significantly (Kim & Malhotra, 2005; Straub et al., 1995). Thus,
collective empirical evidence suggests that the accuracy of a decision aid can differentially affect actual
usage in contrast to trust and perceived usage. In short, when a decision aid provides inaccurate
recommendations to a “cognitive miser”, it is entirely possible for the perceived (i.e., conscious) and
actual (i.e., subconscious) dimensions of usage to differ significantly if technology use is not completely
intentional as we argue. Thus, as a test of intentionality in decision aid use, we propose:
H3: The effect of decision aid accuracy on self-reported (a) trust and (b) usage is stronger than its
effect on (c) actual use behaviors.

4. Method
4.1. Overview
To investigate our hypotheses, we conducted an experimental simulation in which participants viewed
information about stocks and made purchase (buy/no buy) decisions. We developed a financial decision aid
for this purpose (Figure 1). The aid provided participants with raw information about a stock (on the left side
of Figure 1): previous years’ prices, comments from financial analysts, and recent headlines from mass
media. In addition, the tool provided a prediction of the future stock prices and a recommendation (buy/no
buy) along with its basis (on the right side of Figure 1). We dichotomously varied the accuracy of the
decision aid’s recommendation between participants. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the
two accuracy treatments (i.e., high or low accuracy) and repeated the stock purchasing task five times. After
each decision (buy/no buy), the aid provided immediate feedback to the participant about the action of the
stock price. Hence, participants had immediate knowledge about the accuracy of the aid after each decision.
An eye tracker (see Section 4.3.2 for details) recorded participants’ eye movements to understand their
actual use of the information displayed by the decision aid. Additionally, by comparing participants’ selfreported trust in the decision aid and future use intentions with their actual acceptance of the decision
aid’s recommendation, we assessed participants’ intentionality during use.

Figure 1. Financial Decision Aid
AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction
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4.2. Participants
A sample (n = 29) of graduate and undergraduate students participated in this experiment. Due to the
nature of collecting and interpreting eye tracker data, similar sample sizes are common for data
collections at a single location (e.g., the sample sizes in Cyr, Head, Larios, & Pan (2009) and Djamasbi,
Siegel, Skorinko, & Tullis (2011) were 22 and 30, respectively). We recruited participants from a business
college at a large Mid-Western university. These students were, on average, 22.5 years’ old, and 64.3
percent were male. Participants received extra credit to encourage participation worth approximately 1
percent of their grade. We excluded one participant’s eye tracking data due to excessive movement that
rendered the participant’s gaze untrackable. Thus, the effective sample size was 28.
Participants were enrolled in a financial modeling class that addresses stock valuation in detail. We began
recruiting participants after the in-class instruction and exercises regarding stock valuation were completed.
Therefore, all participants were familiar with the stock valuation task. Since we focused on how the
participants interacted with the decision aid (i.e., their intentionality and complacency) rather than their
actual stock valuation performance (which was not evaluated in our experiment), we believe that their
informed familiarity with the topic qualified them as potential users of a similar financial decision aid and,
hence, as legitimate participants in our experiment. Student participants with similar levels of familiarity have
been commonly used in other financial decision making studies (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, & Simko, 1995; Libby,
Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002; Peterson, 2001). Thus, we expected students’ familiarity with our experimental
context to be sufficient for this study and the effects of sampling students to be minimal (see DeSanctis,
1988). Nevertheless, we measured task familiarity and included it as a control variable.

4.3. Measurement
4.3.1. Independent Variable—Accuracy
We dichotomously manipulated the accuracy of the decision aid between subjects such that it was either
completely accurate (i.e., 5/5 correct recommendations) or mostly inaccurate (i.e., 2/5 correct
recommendations; only the second and fifth recommendations were correct, and the first, third, and fourth
recommendations were incorrect). We refer to these experimental conditions as the “high accuracy” and
the “low accuracy” conditions, respectively. Each participant received only one of the two accuracy
treatments. We selected two of five correct recommendations for the low-accuracy condition rather than
five inaccurate recommendations because a consistently wrong decision aid could be considered highly
accurate, only in the wrong direction. In such a setting, it would be possible for participants to consistently
select the opposite of the aid’s recommendations and have perfectly accurate decisions. Such an
approach would essentially make the decision aid reliable and confound our results. Thus, we designed
the decision aid to make occasionally correct recommendations. We assessed the effectiveness of this
manipulation via two seven-point Likert-type items (“The decision aid was accurate”, “The decision aid’s
recommendation was correct”) after the participants completed the five trials. We performed the
manipulation checks after the participants completed all trials, rather than after each trial, to prevent
potential priming effects. Asking the participants to consider the accuracy or correctness of the decision
aid’s recommendation after each trial could have primed them to be suspicious of the recommendations
or to expect the decision aid to be consistently accurate or inaccurate, either of which could have
confounded our results. Comparing the responses of the participants in the two conditions (high vs. low
accuracy) revealed a statistically significant difference (p<0.001) for both items (see Table 2). Hence, we
deemed our manipulation of decision aid accuracy to be effective.

4.3.2. Dependent Variables—Complacency
We used a Tobii TX-300 eye tracker with a 300 Hz sampling rate to capture participants’ verification
efforts. Other researchers have used similar eye trackers from the same manufacturer to examine
individuals’ information browsing behaviors, such as reading expert opinions on a webpage (Djamasbi,
Siegel, & Tullis, 2012) or simply browsing e-commerce sites to select products (Sheng & Joginapelly,
2012). We collected two types of data via the eye tracker: view time and fixation count.
View time is a measure of the time a participant spends looking at a given area on their screen. Greater
time spent viewing an area is consistent with greater cognitive effort or verification (Parasuraman &
Manzey, 2010). To capture these data, the experimenter identifies areas of interest (AOIs) on the
computer monitor. The specific AOIs defined for this experiment were the portion of the screen that
AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction
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displayed the raw information about the particular stock (see the left hand side of Figure 2) and the
portion of the screen that provided the information from the decision aid (see the right hand side of Figure
2). These data provided our measure of how much time each participant spent gazing at the raw
information about a stock versus the decision aid’s estimation and recommendation.
Fixation count indicates the number of times a participant fixated their gaze on a given area of the screen.
Consistent with view time, higher fixation counts are indicative of higher levels of cognitive effort or
verification. Based on the AOIs described above, we recorded how many times a participant focused on
the raw information (displayed on the left hand side) about a stock versus the decision aid’s estimation
and recommendation (provided on the right hand side).

Figure 2. Areas of Interest (AOI) for the Financial Decision Aid (Raw Information AOI: Highlighted
Above on Left; Decision Aid AOI: Highlighted Above on Right)
Researchers have measured complacency as the extent to which users verify a decision aid’s
recommendation (Bahner, Hüper, & Manzey, 2008). When non-complacent users notice a wrong or
suspicious recommendation, they take more time to process available information as they consider the
recommendation (Manzey, Reichenbach, & Onnasch, 2008). Hence, spending a relatively longer time on
a decision task is an important characteristic of non-complacent decision making. Conversely, relying on
heuristics inherently speeds up the overall decision making process (Kahneman, 2011). As such,
complacent users spend less time making buy/no buy decisions. Further, the development of
complacency would be evident when consecutive decisions are accomplished at a faster rate (i.e., later
decisions take less time than earlier ones due to less effort spent verifying recommendations). In this
study, therefore, we associate complacency with a decreasing view time and fixation count for either the
decision aid or the raw information areas over task trials.

4.3.3. Dependent Variables—Intentionality
We measured use intentions via four survey items (adapted from Hayes, 2006) that captured participants’
perceptions of their reliance on the decision aid and their intentions to rely on it in the future (Appendix A
(point 1)). We combined the responses (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.83) into a mean score of use and
continuance intentions.
To assess participants’ trust in the decision aid, they responded to seven survey items (adapted from the
Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000 study of trust in decision aids; Appendix A (point 2)). We combined the
responses (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.86) to create a mean score of trust.
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We recorded recommendation acceptance as an objective measure of the participants’ reliance on the
decision aid. Specifically, participants’ agreement with the decision aid’s recommendation was recorded
after each stock purchase decision. When a participant’s decision (buy/no buy) agreed with the
recommendation, a code of 1 was assigned; if not, a code of 0 was assigned. We converted these values
into an average agreement score (in percentage) to measure complacency. For instance, if only 3 of a
participant’s decisions matched with the respective recommendations of the decision aid, we calculated
that individual’s average agreement score to be 60 percent (3/5).

4.3.4. Control Variable—Task Familiarity
Despite participants’ familiarity with stock valuation, we wished to rule out the alternative explanation that
participants’ knowledge and experience in the specific context influenced their reliance on a decision aid
in that context. Therefore, we asked the participants about their previous experience with buying stocks.
We asked participants to self-report their familiarity with buying stocks by responding to two survey items
(adapted from a study of task analysis by Adams, 2010; Appendix A (point 3). We combined the
responses (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74) to form a mean score of task familiarity.

5. Procedures
During recruitment, we informed each participant that they would view some information about stocks and
be asked to make purchase (buy/no buy) decisions based on their prediction of the future performance of
the stocks. The participants individually came to a laboratory where they were verbally briefed by the
experimenter (following a script) about the nature of the experiment, was given the chance to ask
questions, and gave consent. We randomly assigned each participant to an experimental condition (i.e.,
high or low accuracy). Then, we seated the participant in front of a computer monitor equipped with an
eye-tracking device, similar to a large webcam. To capture view time and fixation count, the eye tracker
must first be calibrated to each participant. To accomplish this, after participants were seated in front of
the computer, we asked them to follow a red circle that moved around on the screen with their eyes.
Following calibration, data collection began as the experimenter left the room and the instruction and
training phase commenced.
The purpose of the instruction and training phase was to ensure that participants understood the
experimental instructions and were familiar with the experimental process prior to the actual experiment.
Such training is particularly important for studies in which participants repeat a task (e.g., McNab et al.,
2011; Shaft & Vessey, 1995) to prevent potential confounds with the learning effects associated with
repeated use. Therefore, we walked each participant through a practice stock purchase decision. The
nine-step instruction process visually and narratively guided the participants through making a stock
purchasing decision and highlighted all of the information available on the decision aid. During each
instruction step, a portion of the screen was highlighted, and detailed instructions relevant to the
highlighted area were provided at the middle of their screen (see Figure 1). We instructed each
participant to interact with the decision aid as they would in the actual experiment. During the instruction
and training phase, we advised the participants that the decision aid’s recommendations might not be
perfectly accurate. Further, a notice stayed on the screen for the duration of the experiment (highlighted
at the top right corner in Figure 1). At the end of the training phase, the participants were instructed to call
the experimenter if they required any clarification. None required additional explanation.
As the participants performed the experimental task for each of the five different stocks, the eye-tracker
recorded their gaze to obtain view times and fixation counts. We randomly chose the stocks used in the
experiment, and the information, prices, and future price estimations presented to the participant were
fictional. When the participant made a decision, a feedback message appeared that indicated if the price
of the stock increased or decreased, consistent with the trend in the raw information provided to the
participants. Hence, the direction of each stock’s price was consistent with the raw data presented to the
participant. Participants had unlimited time to complete the five trials, for which they took an average of
seven minutes and two seconds. After each participant completed all five decisions, the eye tracker was
turned off and the participant was asked to respond to an online survey containing the items regarding
use intentions, trust, and task familiarity (Appendix A) before being excused. Prior to the main
experiment, we conducted a pilot study with three doctoral students. Based on their experiences, we
deemed that no changes to the decision aid or experimental procedures were necessary.

AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction

Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp.17-42, March 2015

25

Complacency and Intentionality in IT Use and Continuance

Yetgin et. al

6. Results
We conducted two distinct analyses with the complacency and intentionality variables. Table 2 presents
the descriptive statistics for all variables. Because of the relatively small sample size and new
instrumentation (developed as suggested by Jasperson et al., 2005) used in this exploratory study, we
report all effects that approached conventional levels of statistical significance (p<0.10).
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Complacency variables

Raw information view time

Raw information fixation count

Decision aid view time

Decision aid fixation count

Recommendation acceptance

Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5

Intentionality variables
Use
Trust
Mean recommendation acceptance
Control variable
Task familiarity
Manipulation checks
“The decision aid was accurate”
“The decision aid’s recommendation was correct”

Experimental condition
Low accuracy
High accuracy
Mean (St. Dev.)
Mean (St. Dev.)
33.92 (15.49)
43.15 (23.62)
32.21 (19.39)
36.04 (22.21)
33.48 (17.97)
28.89 (13.78)
39.50 (32.22)
29.63 (17.02)
24.17 (19.25)
28.94 (19.52)
107.00 (34.01)
126.53 (57.91)
97.31 (50.62)
105.53 (62.92)
100.85 (48.80)
90.93 (38.71)
110.46 (82.53)
91.67 (47.56)
78.69 (57.94)
90.93 (50.78)
11.37 (4.29)
16.18 (11.71)
10.39 (7.08)
10.06 (5.46)
8.39 (5.85)
7.97 (6.75)
11.38 (10.79)
7.54 (7.77)
6.91 (6.42)
9.58 (7.78)
43.85 (15.45)
57.60 (37.55)
36.69 (21.04)
35.00 (14.82)
32.31 (20.40)
27.73 (21.03)
40.92 (38.74)
23.67 (14.17)
24.54 (20.68)
33.47 (22.05)
0.69 (0.48)
0.40 (0.51)
0.77 (0.44)
0.60 (0.51)
0.31 (0.48)
0.73 (0.46)
0.54 (0.52)
0.80 (0.41)
0.77 (0.44)
0.93 (0.26)
Low accuracy
High accuracy
Mean (St. Dev.)
Mean (St. Dev.)
3.25 (0.95)
4.28 (1.22)
3.00 (0.63)
4.97 (0.77)
0.62 (0.15)
0.69 (0.17)
Low accuracy
High accuracy
Mean (St. Dev.)
Mean (St. Dev.)
2.88 (1.50)
3.13 (1.27)
Low accuracy
High accuracy
Mean (St. Dev.)
Mean (St. Dev.)
3.15 (1.21)
6.67 (1.05)
2.77 (1.09)
6.80 (0.78)

To investigate complacency, we fit a repeated-measure analyses of covariance (Repeated ANCOVA)
model for each dependent variable. For each model, the accuracy of the decision aid (i.e., low or high
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accuracy) was entered as a between-subjects variable, trial (i.e., the series of purchasing decisions for
stocks 1-5) as a within-subjects variable, and the complacency measures (i.e., view time and fixation
count for the raw information AOI and the decision aid AOI) as the dependent variables. Task familiarity
was entered as a covariate into all of the models. Among these four models, we observed three
significant effects (Appendix B): The main effects of trial on decision aid view time (F(4,100) = 2.070, p =
0.090) and fixation count (F(4,100) = 2.101, p = 0.086) and the interaction effect of trial and accuracy on
raw information view time (F(3.541,88.521) = 2.287, p = 0.074). These results support H1 and H2. Figure
3 depicts each of these effects.
Consistent with our expectations from H1, the main effects of trial on decision aid view time and fixation
count (Figures 3(a) and 3(b)) indicate that participants spent increasingly less time scrutinizing the
decision aid’s estimates and recommendation as the experiment progressed. However, the main effect
for trial was limited to the time spent viewing the decision aid; we did not observe a trial effect on the
fixation count or view time for the raw information.

a. Trial on decision aid view time

b. Trial on decision aid fixation count

c. Trial * accuracy on raw information view time
Figure 3. Significant Effects from Repeated ANCOVAs
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Nevertheless, participants in the high-accuracy condition spent increasingly less time looking at the raw
information as they progressed (Figure 3(c)). This finding, coupled with the increasing acceptance of the
decision aid’s recommendations (Table 2), clearly illustrates complacency developing for participants in
the high-accuracy condition. This finding is consistent with H2, suggesting that accuracy increases the
rate at which complacency develops. However, accuracy was not observed in a significant interaction
effect influencing the view time or fixation count for the decision aid.
In considering these two findings together, we surmise that repeated trials were sufficient to reduce the
amount of attention and scrutiny (i.e., recommendation verification efforts) directed at the decision aid.
But we observed high accuracy, in addition to repeated trials, to further reduce the attention and scrutiny
directed at the raw information.
To examine intentionality (H3), we ran a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) using the mean
recommendation acceptance and the self-reported use and trust measures as the three dependent
variables. Consistent with the previous analysis, accuracy was modeled as a between-subjects variable
with task familiarity as the covariate (Table 3). Accuracy had a significant multivariate effect on the DVs
(Pillai’s Trace = 0.763, F = 23.571, p < 0.001). The models for trust (F(2,24) = 27.117, p<0.001) and selfreported use (F(2,24) = 5.448, p = 0.011) were both significant, with adjusted R-squares of 0.668 and
0.255 and partial eta-squares of 0.693 and 0.312, respectively. The model for recommendation
acceptance was not significant (F(2,24) = 1.333, p<0.282).
According to the univariate, between-subjects tests, participants in the low-accuracy condition (mean =
3.007, s.d. = 0.195) trusted the decision aid less than the participants in the high-accuracy condition
(mean = 4.963, s.d. = 0.188) did (F(1,24) = 52.315, p<0.001). Furthermore, the participants in the lowaccuracy condition (mean = 3.258, s.d. = 0.276) reported using the decision aid less than the participants
in the high-accuracy condition (mean = 4.457, s.d. = 0.266) (F(1,24) = 9.666, p<0.005). However, we did
not detect a significant difference in recommendation acceptance for the high accuracy (mean = 68.7%,
s.d. = 4.5%) and low accuracy (mean = 61.4%, s.d.= 4.3%) conditions. In other words, average
agreement with the decision aid was not significantly different between the low accuracy and highaccuracy conditions, unlike the self-reported use/continuance and trust. This pattern of behavior (i.e.,
agreement with tool) and self-report supports H3.
As a robustness test for H3, we reran the MANCOVA using the mean recommendation acceptance for
only the first, third, and fourth trials (i.e., only the inaccurate recommendations in the low-accuracy
condition) instead of the mean recommendation acceptance for all trials, which produced similar results.
The model for recommendation acceptance (F(2,24) = 1.434, p<0.258) and the difference between the
recommendation acceptance for the high accuracy and low-accuracy conditions were still not statistically
significant.

7. Discussion
The results of our study confirm that a decision aid, when highly accurate, provides many beneficial
properties; its users trust its recommendations, find it useful, and indicate a willingness to rely on it in the
future. Along with these beneficial properties, however, we observed some important issues that could
negatively affect individuals’ interaction with a decision aid and users’ decision quality. Below, we discuss
our results and main findings.
The overall results reveal a consistent overall decline in recommendation verification efforts (i.e., all four
eye tracking measures) over time across both treatments (see Table 2). Note that this decline was
particularly sharp for the last (i.e., fifth) trial in the low-accuracy condition; compared to the previous (i.e.,
fourth) trial, raw information view time decreased 39 percent, raw information fixation count decreased 29
percent, decision aid view time decreased 39 percent, and decision aid fixation count decreased 40
percent. In contrast, this drop off in view times and fixation counts was accompanied by a 43 percent
increase in average recommendation acceptance (i.e., .54 to .77). We argue that this trend serves as a
vivid example of complacency because it demonstrates a substantial overall decrease in recommendation
verification efforts coupled with an equally substantial increase in recommendation acceptance even
though we provided the participants with two consecutive incorrect recommendations for prior (i.e., third
and fourth) trials. In other words, the participants were more in agreement with the decision aid’s
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recommendation and less questioning of it after having received two incorrect recommendations in a row.
Although we observed a general declining pattern in recommendation verification efforts, the amount of
decline was not always consistent as evidenced by the particularly sharp decline for the fifth trial. These
findings suggest that the onset of complacency may develop rather abruptly after a certain threshold of
trials has been reached. We call for future research to investigate this potential threshold effect and the
factors (e.g., decision context or complexity) that might influence this threshold and hence the pace of
complacency.
Table 3. MANCOVA Between-Subject Effects
Source

Dependent variable

Type III
sum of
squares

Corrected
model

Use

10.787

2

Trust

26.702

Recommendation
acceptance
Intercept

Task
familiarity

Accuracy

Error

Total

Corrected
Total

Df Mean square

Partial
Observed
eta
power
squared

F

Sig.

5.393

5.448

.011

.312

.884

2

13.351

27.117 .000

.693

1.000

.069

2

.034

1.333

.282

.100

.382

Use

53.153

1

53.153

53.692 .000

.691

1.000

Trust

59.571

1

59.571

120.992 .000

.834

1.000

Recommendation
acceptance

2.382

1

2.382

92.415 .000

.794

1.000

Use

.848

1

.848

.856

.364

.034

.233

Trust

.558

1

.558

1.134

.298

.045

.275

Recommendation
acceptance

.035

1

.035

1.373

.253

.054

.309

Use

9.666

1

9.666

9.764

.005

.289

.918

Trust

25.758

1

25.758

52.315 .000

.686

1.000

Recommendation
acceptance

.036

1

.036

1.411

.056

.314

Use

23.759

24

.990

Trust

11.816

24

.492

Recommendation
acceptance

.619

24

.026

Use

440.938

27

Trust

475.102

27

Recommendation
acceptance

12.160

27

Use

34.546

26

Trust

38.519

26

Recommendation
acceptance

.687

26

.247

The first main finding relates to the development of complacency. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) indicate that
participants in either accuracy condition spent less time and attention examining the decision aid as they
progressed through the five trials. As Table 2 shows, participants in the high-accuracy condition seem to
have continuously and increasingly relied on the decision aid’s recommendation, which indicates
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complacency. On the other hand, the relatively early sharp decline in the participants’ agreement with the
decision aid in the low-accuracy condition suggests that they might have noticed the inaccuracy initially
and began questioning or not relying on the decision aid. Nevertheless, the following steep incline in their
agreement indicates that the participants in the low-accuracy condition began to adopt the decision aid’s
recommendations despite the evidence that they realized inaccuracies in the decision aid’s
recommendations. Even though our findings suggest that accuracy might have an impact on the rate of
complacency development, it seems that participants in both conditions were prone to becoming
complacent. In other words, inaccuracy seemed to have (only) a short-term effect on use that was easily
reversed by subsequent accurate recommendations. This finding suggests that reliance on decision aids
might be robust to inaccuracy when the only alternative is intense cognitive effort, such as manual
calculations to estimate stock prices.
An alternative explanation for the decrease in view times is that the participants learned how to use the
decision aid over time and spent less time viewing the information it presented as the number of usage
trials increased because they became more competent in using the decision aid and locating the relevant
information (i.e., learning effects). Although we cannot entirely rule out the effects of learning, we believe
that the decrease in view times can be attributed primarily to the development of complacency rather than
learning effects for three main reasons. First, we instructed and trained the participants on how to use the
decision aid before the experiment started. Therefore, we believe it is not likely that the participants’ view
times decreased as a result of learning how to use the decision aid over time because they were already
familiar with the aid before the experiment began. Second, even though the decision aid layout remained
the same, we provided the participants with different information content for each trial (such as different
headlines and comments that they had to consider rather than with closing prices that they could
compare), which is a common procedure for reducing the possibility of learning effects (e.g., Adipat,
Zhang, & Zhou, 2011; Djamasbi et al., 2012). Third, attributing the decrease in view times to learning
effects assumes that the participants learned how to use the decision aid to evaluate stocks faster over
time. However, as Figure 3 shows, we observed that the participants spent an estimated average of eight
seconds viewing the decision aid area and roughly 25 seconds viewing the raw information area for the
final task. We argue that it is unlikely participants evaluated the stocks’ performance and the decision
aid’s recommendation in such a short period of time considering the string of cognitive activities that
needed to occur if they relied on the information provided rather than the decision aid’s recommendation.
To make an informed decision or assess the aid’s recommendation, the participants first had to
incorporate the monthly closing prices for the past seven years, four recent headlines, three analyst
comments, monthly estimated closing prices for the next year, and three bases for the decision aid’s
recommendation into their knowledge structures and then evaluate the usefulness and weight of each
piece of information. Considering the unlikelihood that the participants evaluated, weighed, and verified all
of these pieces of information in roughly 30 seconds, we believe that the participants could only have
taken a heuristic approach to making their decisions based primarily on the decision aid’s
recommendation without spending enough time to verify it against the raw information. Thus,
accompanied by the participants’ increasing reliance on the decision aid’s recommendations over time
(as Table 2 shows), we believe that the decrease in view times can be attributed to a decrease in
participants’ verification efforts due to complacency rather than their becoming proficient in using the
decision aid. Nevertheless, we cannot completely discount the possibility that learning effects played a
role in the reduction of verification efforts and in the increase of recommendation acceptance. We further
discuss this possibility as a limitation that future research can address toward the end of the paper.
All in all, it seems possible for complacency to develop regardless of accuracy, which further suggests
that system 1 might be more influential on repeated or continuous technology use than many theoretical
models indicate. The heat maps generated based on the eye tracker data (Figure 4) help explain this
process. Recall that we observed that decision aid view time and fixation count declined across trials
regardless of accuracy. To better comprehend the process, we display two sets of maps: one for the
participants who worked in the high-accuracy condition and another for those that worked in the lowaccuracy condition. In the high-accuracy condition, participants displayed a fairly steady decrease in the
amount of attention given to the information provided with the decision aid (see the areas that present the
recommendation basis and the predicted stock prices) and the raw information (see the areas that display
stock prices, recent headlines, and analyst comments). Note that the attention paid to the actual
recommendation remains fairly stable throughout the trials. In the low-accuracy condition, the
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development of complacency is still apparent although perhaps somewhat limited due to the inaccurate
recommendations.
Trials

High-Accuracy Condition

Low-Accuracy Condition

Trial 1

Trial 2

Trial 3

Trial 4

Trial 5

Figure 4. Heat Maps by Accuracy Condition
Another finding of this study reveals that complacency can develop rather quickly. Even though we only ran
five trials, relatively few compared to an organizational setting, we clearly observed complacency’s
development. One possible explanation for this finding is that task complexity facilitates complacency, which
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is consistent with the cognitive-miser hypothesis of automation bias (Hollands & Wickens, 1999) that argues
that human decision makers have a tendency to choose the path of least cognitive effort and, therefore, will
be more likely to base complex decisions on decision aid recommendations rather than all other available
information (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). The present experimental task (i.e., stock purchasing) is a
fairly complex task with many inputs to the valuation (i.e., previous closing prices, recent headlines, and
analyst comments). The complacency that we observed developing could be the result of the difficulty of the
task, the number of inputs that participants had to review, and/or the unclear decision model of the decision
aid (i.e., the weights applied to the different input variables). More research is required to better understand
the extent to which task complexity promotes the development of complacency.
Our third finding indicates that complacency may have two main components. Our results suggest a
dichotomy in the rise of complacency, and this insight comes from the way we captured it using an eye
tracker. As time progresses, participants paid less attention to the decision aid (Figures 3(a) and 3(b)).
This suggests that familiarity, which is a function of time, is the precipitating factor that leads to a
decrease in scrutiny of the decision aid. However, our data suggest that a combination of time and
accuracy were required to affect the attention participants paid to the raw information used to develop the
recommendations (i.e., efforts to verify the aids’ recommendation). Therefore, high accuracy and
repeated usage of the decision aid may be necessary to reduce participants’ verification efforts. This
finding is consistent with the suggestion that users who are repeatedly exposed to a highly reliable
decision aid will be more likely to engage in automatic or mindless usage behaviors (Parasuraman &
Manzey, 2010). More research is necessary to investigate this dichotomy in complacency, but our results
demonstrate that different factors influence the scrutiny of the decision aid and the verification of the
decision’s recommendations.
Finally, and perhaps most notably, our findings address the intentionality of IT use, a critical assumption
made in much past MIS research. Our results point to a discrepancy between objective and subjective
measures of decision aid use. Although participants reported different levels of trust and use between the
high-accuracy and low-accuracy conditions, they did not differ significantly in terms of their actual reliance
on the decision aid (as measured by their average agreement with the decision aid). Nor did they differ
with regard to the time and attention spent on the decision aid (as evidenced by the view times and
fixation counts). This finding indicates that mostly system 1 was driving participants’ use of the decision
aid in this study and supports the argument that individuals may not always be fully aware of how or how
much they use technology (Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009). Moreover, participants’ trust in the decision
aid was strongly associated with their self-reported use and continuance intentions, whereas we didn’t
find their trust to be associated with the participants’ actual reliance on the decision aid. Taken together,
these results imply that, while trust may be strongly influential on individuals’ intentions to use technology,
it may not be as powerful in driving the actual use or continuance of technology, which Lee and Moray
(2004) suggest. In particular, when one examines the relationship between trust and use, it seems that
there is more to the story when we look at actual use behaviors rather than only self-reported measures
(e.g., use or usage intentions).

8. Implications
This study contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, it improves our understanding of the
use of decision aids and provides empirical support for the argument that IT use is less intentional and
more automatic than previously assumed (Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009). In doing so, it also suggests
that the relationships between use and its antecedents (e.g., trust or accuracy) might be weaker than
traditionally assumed by studies based on self-reported data. This is a theoretical contribution to the
literature because our findings highlight the automatic nature of technology use and shows that the
traditional assumption of rational and mindful technology use might not always hold. Second, this study
helps us better understand how complacency develops, even without the previously suggested
prerequisite that the decision aid being mostly reliable (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).
Finally, the results of this study yield important insights into the use and misuse of decision aids, including
practical implications regarding user training and the design of decision aids.
Our observation that individuals may rely on decision aids even after realizing that the aid is faulty raises
a significant concern about using decision aids in critical contexts. Based on our findings, we suggest that
users of decision aids be warned and/or trained about complacency, especially in critical contexts where
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it cannot be tolerated. When system 1 is driving the use of a decision aid, it is easy for users to ignore
important and relevant red flags such as inaccurate recommendations and continue to rely on the
decision aid. While realizing inaccuracies might not be enough to activate system 2, training users to
carefully scrutinize their “gut feelings” and to recognize when they are in a “cognitive minefield” can help
them successfully overcome such complacency by willfully activating system 2 (Kahneman, 2011).
To assist individuals in building appropriate behaviors about using and operating decision aids, we also
suggest that users should be exposed to boundary events where the accuracy of the decision aid may
degrade unbeknownst to them. Even though this approach might appear undesirable at first, it may be
more fruitful than simply warning users about the potential for inaccuracy, which, we observed, did not
help much with preventing complacency. Previous research suggests that exposing users to rare false
recommendations can be a successful countermeasure for complacency even though it cannot be
completely prevented this way (Bahner et al., 2008). Combined with proper training, such intentional false
recommendations can help maximize users’ verification efforts and potentially minimize complacency.
Besides focusing on users, it could also be possible to mitigate complacency via designing decision aids
aimed at keeping users aware of their reliance on the decision aid. This could be done by developing
feedback mechanisms that inform users about their verification efforts and progressive reliance on the
decision aids’ recommendations. For instance, warning users about immediate agreement with the
decision aid or about significant and consistent decreases in the time they take to make consecutive
decisions may be beneficial. Since system 2 often endorses ideas and feelings generated by system 1, it
is difficult for individuals to distinguish between elaborated and heuristic-based decisions (Kahneman,
2011). Such external warnings about their behaviors could help users realize that system 1 is driving their
decision making process and encourage them to willfully engage system 2 to override complacency.
Alternatively, the recommendations of the decision aid could be periodically turned off for pre-defined
non-critical tasks, which would force the activation of system 2 because users would have to make their
own decisions based on the raw information available. This could help keep the users relatively more
active in the decision making process and aid in mitigating their over-reliance on the decision aid. We call
for future research to explore how effective such measures are for the mitigation of complacency.

9. Limitations and Future Research
One inherent limitation of our exploratory study is the small sample size and, hence, the marginal
statistical significance of some of our results. Although similar sample sizes are common among past
studies using similar methodologies, a larger sample size would provide a more stringent test of the
pattern of behaviors we observed and predicted. Furthermore, the context of the decision making problem
might play an important role in the development of complacency and intentionality. Thus, it would be
beneficial for future researchers to replicate, confirm, and expand our exploratory findings in additional
decision making contexts and perhaps with professional users of decision aids, such as professional
stockbrokers.
In this study, we assumed a direct relationship between accuracy and complacency, consistent with
previous research (e.g., Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996; Parasuraman et al., 1993). However, there are
several cognitive processes and mechanisms through which accuracy can indirectly influence
complacency, such as habit and trust formation or carelessness (i.e., decrease in attention). We call for
future research to investigate and distinguish between the mechanisms through which accuracy can
impact complacency to further improve our understanding of complacency and how to mitigate it.
Even though we observed complacency develop regardless of accuracy, modifications to our
experimental design could allow researchers to investigate effects of different elements of inaccuracy on
its development. For instance, it is possible that the timing (i.e., early vs. late), frequency (i.e., rare vs.
often), and magnitude (i.e., small vs. large) of the inaccuracy of recommendations could impact how likely
or how quickly a user is to become complacent. Future studies could examine how such factors affect
users’ reliance on a decision aid, intentionality, and complacency.
As we previously note, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of learning effects as an alternative
explanation for the decrease in participants’ verification efforts accompanied by their increasing reliance
on the decision aid’s recommendations. Future research could address this limitation by confirming our
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findings regarding complacency in other contexts. Potential learning effects could also be minimized
through experimental design by conducting a much longer training phase and/or by randomizing the
experimental task order plus the timing, frequency, and magnitude of recommendation errors between
participants.
Another avenue for future research, which we point out earlier, is studying how to avoid or mitigate
complacency either through the design of decision aids or the training of their users. The findings of such
research can help us better understand individuals’ attitude towards and interaction with decision aids
and improve their decision quality.
Finally, the findings of this study point towards the necessity of validating or revising previous theoretical
models developed on studies involving only self-reported usage or use intention data. Future studies on
other potentially automatic or mindless processes similar to technology use/continuance, such as
technology acceptance or resistance, could also benefit from using objective data.

10. Conclusion
Decision aids improve the effectiveness of decision making beyond a level that humans alone can reach;
however, most can occasionally offer incorrect recommendations. Many recent anecdotes point to the
dangers of relying on recommendations of decision aids in an automatic and complacent manner. In this
study, we investigated the development of complacency and intentionality in decision aid use. Our results
support the arguments that technology use might not be as intentional as traditionally assumed and that
complacency can develop regardless of the accuracy of the decision aid. These findings have important
implications for HCI, MIS, and DSS researchers and for practitioners who design or frequently rely on
decision aids. We call for future research to build on our findings and explore further the antecedents and
consequences of complacency and intentionality in technology use.
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Appendix A. Survey Items (Answered on a 1-7 Scale)
1. Use/continuance (adapted from Hayes, 2006):
A. To what extent did you use this decision aid to make a buy/no-buy decision?
(1—not at all; 7—a lot)
B. To what extend did you rely on the recommendation of this decision aid in making your final
buying decision?
(1—not at all; 7—a lot)
C. If available in the future, how likely are you to use this decision aid to make a stock purchasing
decision?
(1—very unlikely; 7—very likely)
D. If available in the future, how likely are you to rely on the recommendation of this decision aid in
making your final buying decision?
(1—very unlikely; 7—very likely)
2. Trust (adapted from Jian et al., 2000):
A. The decision aid is deceptive.
(1—not at all; 7—extremely)
B. The decision aid behaves in an underhanded manner.
(1—not at all; 7—extremely)
C. I am suspicious of the decision aid’s recommendation.
(1—not at all; 7—extremely)
D. I am confident in the decision aid.
(1—not at all; 7—extremely)
E. The decision aid is dependable.
(1—not at all; 7—extremely)
F. The decision aid is reliable.
(1—not at all; 7—extremely)
G. I can trust the decision aid.
(1—not at all; 7—extremely)
3. Task familiarity (adapted from Adams, 2010):
A. How familiar are you with buying stocks?
(1—not very familiar; 7—very familiar)
B. How frequently do you buy stocks?
(1—never; 7—very often)
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Appendix B. Results of Repeated ANCOVAs
Table B-1. Raw Information View Time—Within-Subject Effects1
Source

Df

Mean square

F

Sig.

Trial

Type III sum of
squares
1103.058

.194

Partial eta
squared
.059

Observed
power
.571

3.541

311.523

1.576

Trial * task familiarity

478.555

3.541

135.152

.684

.588

.027

.311

Trial * accuracy

1601.067

3.541

452.169

2.287

.074

.084

.727

Error (trial)

17501.900

88.521

197.714

1

Huynh-Feldt corrected scores are reported since the sphericity assumption was violated (Mauchly’s W =
0.431, p < 0.020).
Table B-2. Raw Information View Time—Between-Subject Effects
Source

Df

Mean square

Intercept

Type III sum of
squares
18198.408

F

1

18198.408

Task familiarity

646.259

1

646.259

.445

Accuracy

2.624

1

2.624

.002

Error

36313.898

25

1452.556

Sig.

Partial eta
squared
.334

Observed
power
.964

.511

.017

.171

.966

.000

.100

Observed
power
.638

12.529 .002

Table B-3. Raw Information Fixation Count—Within-Subject Effects1
Source

Df

Mean square

F

Sig.

Trial

Type III sum of
squares
9979.839

3.792

2631.917

1.775

.144

Partial eta
squared
.066

Trial * task familiarity

5023.812

3.792

1324.896

.894

.467

.035

.387

Trial * accuracy

6839.512

3.792

1803.739

1.217

.309

.046

.488

Error (trial)

140541.243

94.796

1482.560

1

We report Huynh-Feldt corrected scores since the sphericity assumption was violated (Mauchly’s W =
0.485, p < 0.050).
Table B-4. Raw Information Fixation Count—Between-Subject Effects
Source

Df

Mean square

Intercept

Type III sum of
squares
175463.648

1

175463.648

Task familiarity

4361.789

1

4361.789

.461

Accuracy

51.181

1

51.181

.005

Error

236410.285

25

9456.411

AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction

F

Sig.

Partial eta
squared
.426

Observed
power
.994

.503

.018

.173

.942

.000

.101

18.555 .000
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Table B-5. Decision Aid View Time—Within-Subject Effects1
Source

1

Df

Mean square

F

Sig.

Trial

Type III sum of
squares
435.440

.090

Partial eta
squared
.076

Observed
power
.719

4

108.860

2.070

Trial * task familiarity

230.208

4

57.552

1.094

.364

.042

.461

Trial * accuracy

292.832

4

73.208

1.392

.242

.053

.551

Error (trial)

5258.576

100

52.586

Partial eta
squared
.401

Observed
power
.990

The sphericity assumption was not violated (Mauchly’s W = 0.660, p < 0.374).

Table B-6. Decision Aid View Time—Between-Subject Effects
Source

Df

Mean Square

Intercept

Type III sum of
squares
1468.798

F

Sig.

1

1468.798

16.734 .000

Task familiarity

107.908

1

107.908

1.229

.278

.047

.289

Accuracy

5.958

1

5.958

.068

.797

.003

.111

Error

2194.323

25

87.773

Observed
power
.725

Table B-7. Decision Aid Fixation Count—Within-Subject Effects1
Source

1

Df

Mean square

F

Sig.

Trial

Type III sum of
squares
4250.643

4

1062.661

2.101

.086

Partial eta
squared
.078

Trial * task familiarity

1848.279

4

462.070

.914

.459

.035

.403

Trial * accuracy

3930.831

4

982.708

1.943

.109

.072

.691

Error (trial)

50580.605

100

505.806

Partial eta
squared
.490

Observed
power
.999

The sphericity assumption was not violated (Mauchly’s W = 0.661, p < 0.378).

Table B-8. Decision Aid Fixation Count—Between-Subject Effects
Source

Df

Mean square

Intercept

Type III sum of
squares
20892.837

1

20892.837

Task familiarity

807.776

1

807.776

.929

.344

.036

.245

Accuracy

13.106

1

13.106

.015

.903

.001

.102

Error

21736.325

25

869.453
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F

Sig.

24.030 .000
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